

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Rylia - 5/1

3 August 1948

Mr. George F. Kennan Director, Policy Planning Staff Department of State Washington, D. C. Policy Planning Staff AJG 4 1948

Department of State

Dear George:

Knowing how busy you are, I am sending the attached draft straight to you in order that you may go over it in your spare moments (if you have any). After you have gone over the whole thing, I should like to come over and see you whenever it is agreeable to you and get your comments and advice on the matter.

The first part, about the delay in getting the Moscow report, I imagine, was caused by one of those delays which should not happen but nevertheless do happen in every organization. As it turned out, the report submitted by the <u>sd</u> hog committee is in most close agreement with the Moscow estimate. It is reassuring to find two entirely different groups of people coming up with the same answer when confronted with the same problem.

The principal thing that we must strive for, I believe, is that none of the executive departments or agencies be caught, in case anything does happen, in a position that finds them having information which was not disseminated.

Please give me a ring when you want me to come over.

Sincerely,

R. H. Hillenkoetter Rear Admiral, DSN Director of Central Intelligence

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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3 August 1948

HE DEARDUM FOR: The Socretary of State

Subject: Delay in receipt of information

1. The following facts are submitted for such action as the Secretary may deem appropriate.

### s. Arril 1, 19/8:

The Joint Intelligence Conmittee, U. S. Embassy, Noscow, completed an intensive study of <u>Soviet Intentions</u> with the assistance of specialists in the various sections of the <u>Embassy</u>, including consultation with the Military, Naval and Air Attaches, who concurred in its findings."

### b. Arril 2, 1948:

The Arbassador sent a summary of the report by telegram to the Department of State. This telegram did not reach the Central Intelligence Agency through normal channels. A copy was received, however, through the Central Intelligence Agency's direct liaison with the Secretary's office.

On the same date, copies of the report itself presumably were transmitted by the Military, Naval and Air Attaches in Moscow to their respective departments.

On the same date, the Ambassador trunsmitted five (5) copies of the report by pouch to the Department of State, - "three copies for the use of the Department, and one each for transmission by the Department, if it so desires, to the Department of Defense and to the Director of Central Intelligence."

### c. Arril 13. 1948:

Copy No.1 of the report was received by the Office of the Under Secretary of State.

## d. Arril, May June, July 1948:

An <u>ad hoc</u> interdepartmental committee called by the Director of Intelligence, General Staff, U. S. Army, chairmanned by the Central Intelligence Agency, and which included a Department of



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


State representative, carried out a continuing study of Soviet intentions. As far as is known, no member of this interdepartmental committee had access to the report from our Embassy in Moscow on the same subject.

#### e. July 30, 1948:

On this date, three and one-half months after it had been received by the Department of State, Copy No. 1 of the report was transmitted to the Central Intelligence Agency.

- 2. This delay has explosive possibilities. If it became known to critics, political or otherwise, of the Administration, it would be made to serve as an example of bungling and incompetence in the intelligence structure. Slame would be wide-spread, on the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, etc. It might be noted that hostilities with Russia might well have broken out during the three and a hulf nonth period, and it would be suggested that, bad as the interdepartmental liaison had been before Pearl Marbor, the situation in 1945 was far worse. The implications of such a possible criticism are obvious.
- 3. On a separate, though related subject, I should like to ask your assistance in resolving almost the same problem; i.e., that of being as nearly certain as possible that all intelligence information does, in fact, reach all of the persons who should have it. The various Congressional consittee reports on the Fearl Harbor Investigation repeatedly stressed the fact that there was plenty of information in Washington at the time of Fearl Harbor, but that its dissemination was very much at fault. During the hearings on the National Security Act of 1947, the above point of inadequate dissemination of available intelligence was brought up time and time again. All of the executive departments or agencies would be in a very embarrassing position should an analogous situation come to light at any future time.
- 4. In each of the Departments information of intelligence value from foreign fields is normally received in and distributed by central communications centers and mailrooms. Distribution is apparently through three separate channels:
  - a. To Departmental Secretaries and Service Chiefs of Staff on a very restricted (Eyes Cnly) basis. No further distribution is made except by direction of senior officials in the offices of the Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff concerned.
  - b. To officials charged with operational supervision and action. Such officials apparently have final authority to determine whether further distribution shall be made for intelligence purposes.



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c. To the intelligence agencies of the Departments. In general there are definite indications that this immediate distribution frequently does not contain the information under g. and b. above.


- 5. To attempt to reach a "middle way" between the extremes (1) of being too inquisitive and seeing things not needed, and (2) of not getting some essential piece of information, the following procedure is suggested as a basis for discussion to get the answer to this question.
  - a. Properly qualified, cleared and selected Central Intelligence Agency representatives to be permitted to review the daily intake of all material not disseminated to departmental intelligence agencies to determine those items which may be of overall intelligence value.
  - b. Departmental Secretaries or their representatives to be authorized to restrict further dissemination by the Central Intelligence Agency of material not considered suitable for further dissemination when they may consider such restriction desirable.

A. H. HILLENKOETTER Rear Admiral, USN Director of Central Intelligence

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August 13, 1948

INT 838/5.

## Dear Hilly:

Thank you for your letter of August 3rd. As the subject is not strictly within my field, I have made informal inquiry within the Department and have learned that Mr. Lovett wrote you on the 3rd that Fark Armstrong was designated for lisison with you on all intelligence matters. Your letter apparently crossed with Mr. Lovett's.

Sincerely yours,

George F. Konnan Director, Folicy Planning Staff

Rear Admiral R. B. Hillenkoetter, USN,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington 25, D. C.

S/P: JDavier, Jr.: vh



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